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Cornhusker Economics
Ag Carbon Credits
There is a lot of discussion in the ag community about
ag carbon credits as part of a larger U.S. strategy to
reduce carbon emissions and avoid the very worst impacts of global warming. This newsletter takes us
through some of the basics regarding what ag credits
are and why they are a current topic of discussion.
What are carbon credits? Carbon credits are sometimes purchased by businesses that are being required
to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. A
carbon credit typically represents one metric ton of
carbon dioxide (CO2), the most prevalent GHG, and
can be created by activities reducing GHG emissions,
like reforestation.
The carbon credit concept is based on the 1990 EPA
acid rain program, where coal-fired power plants were
required to lower their sulfur emissions by reducing
the destruction of Canadian and U.S. forests by acidic
precipitation (“acid rain”). All regulated coal-fired
power plants were issued sulfur emission allowances
that would over time require them to reduce annual
sulfur emissions. (One sulfur emission allowance
would authorize the emission of one ton of sulfur by
the holder.) In response, some power plants lowered
their emissions by replacing high-sulfur Appalachian
coal with low-sulfur Wyoming Powder River Basin
coal. Other power plants installed scrubbers to clean
their emissions. These cleaner-burning power plants
often had unused sulfur emission allocations, which
the cleaner plants could sell to the dirty plants that
had not yet started reducing their emissions.

In the global warming context, some states
(California, and several New England and midAtlantic states in the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative or RGGI) and some countries (most of
Europe) are regulating carbon emissions from
coal-fired power plants and large coal-burning
industrial facilities (like cement factories). Often
these carbon regulation programs allow regulated
power and industrial plants to offset part of their
emissions with carbon credits.
Carbon credits are generated when businesses
and entrepreneurs engage in activities that reduce
the release of GHGs, such as converting from coal
-generated electricity to zero GHG electricity
such as wind, solar, hydroelectric or nuclear power. Carbon credits may also be generated when a
building or facility’s energy efficiency is improved. These potential carbon credits must be
documented or certified as truly representing a
stated quantity of reduced or avoided carbon
emissions before they can be approved to offset
regulated carbon emissions from the power or
industrial plant. Purchasing carbon credits can be
less expensive than making the GHG emission
reductions, although they are not a long-term
substitute for making those GHG reductions.
What are agricultural carbon credits? Foresters,
ranchers and farmers can increase the storage of
carbon from the air into the soil through improved forest, grassland and cropland practices. A
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recent study estimates that improved agricultural land
management (including forests) could increase annual
carbon storage in soil by up to 21% of annual U.S.
GHG emissions (Massey & Willett, p. 18). With President Biden’s goal of making the U.S. net carbon neutral
by 2050, ag carbon credits from additional carbon sequestration in forests, grasslands and cropland would
be an important component of achieving that goal.
(Net carbon neutral means that the U.S.’ net GHG
emissions would be zero, which would require a sharp
reduction in fossil fuel combustion.)
What activities might generate ag carbon credits?
Most tons of potential soil carbon storage come from
forest management activities, avoided grassland conversion to cropland and planting cover crops (Massey
& Willett, p. 19). Other agricultural activities potentially generating carbon credits include reduced tillage,
reduced fertilizer applications, and capturing methane
from livestock operations and converting it to electricity. In the U.S., the most ag carbon credits that have
been certified for use in California and RGGI GHG
regulatory programs are from forestry and methane
capture from dairies.
What are the different types of carbon markets? The
two main categories are voluntary markets and compliance markets.
Voluntary carbon markets serve businesses and individuals who wish to offset some or all of their GHG
emissions to accomplish business or personal sustainability goals but who are not legally required to do so.
For example, when Al Gore travels to Europe to give a
climate talk, he might purchase some carbon offsets to
offset his share of the GHG emissions generated in his
cross-Atlantic flight. Some families or businesses may
purchase carbon credits to reduce the size of their collective carbon footprint.
Compliance carbon markets serve regulated entities
who are legally required to reduce their GHG emissions, such as the California, RGGI and EU programs
previously mentioned.
The primary difference between the two markets is the
level of scrutiny activities are subject to before they
qualify as certified carbon credits. The certification
process for carbon credits in compliance markets is
stricter than for the voluntary carbon markets. It is
difficult to say how much of a difference there really is
–- some voluntary certification programs are probably

just as strict as the compliance certification programs. But there is no overall regulation of the voluntary carbon markets to assure that all carbon
credits represent a metric ton of carbon reduction.
What does the U.S. voluntary carbon market
look like today? In 2019, renewable energy represented 42% of the carbon credits generated in the
U.S. for the global voluntary carbon market
(calculated from Donofrio et al., p. 1). Forestry
and land use (including forestry offsets) represented 37%. Other U.S. carbon credit generating activities include waste disposal, chemical processes and
industrial manufacturing, energy efficiency/fuel
switching, and transportation (Donofrio et al., p.
1). There is no central marketplace where these
carbon credit purchases occur, virtually all of the
trades are directly between buyer and seller with
no intermediary (Donofrio et al., pp. 8, 9).
What does the ag carbon credit market look like
today? It is the wild, wild west. No rules or regulations exist, so let the buyers and sellers all beware. From where I sit, the two largest players appear to be speculators and pilot project developers.
The speculators – in my opinion – are attempting
to contract as many acres as they can with the expectation that carbon markets will explode in the
next few years and they will sell their carbon credits at a large profit. One source estimates that the
U.S. voluntary carbon market will grow 1500% by
2030 (Donofrio et al., p. 6). Speculators are placing
their bets now and are willing to pay a premium to
sign acres up early.
The pilot projects (my characterization) are being
developed by several different groups, many with
agribusiness partners or connections. The basic
idea is to sign up some acres and use them as a test
to develop the soil carbon storage information to
credibly document that the improved management
practices have sequestered more carbon in the
farm or ranch land. These firms or groups want to
be the intermediary between ag producers and carbon markets or carbon credit buyers over the long
haul. If you want to learn about these “pilot projects” google “agricultural carbon credits” or
“carbon farming” and get comfortable because you
will find many articles on this topic.

What was the Obama carbon farming market like?
The Kyoto climate treaty and President Obama’s proposed GHG regulatory program led to the development of the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) from
2003-2010. The CCX was organized to sell GHG
emission allowances for GHG emission reduction
and offset projects in North America and Brazil. The
CCX went out of business in 2010 due to the failure
of Congress to enact President Obama’s GHG regulatory program, which led to a lack of interest in trading carbon credits (Wikipedia).
While the CCX was in existence, some groups attempted to aggregate farmer contracts to increase soil
storage (Leonard pp. 335-37). An interesting example
is AgriGate Climate Credits Corp., a subsidiary of the
Iowa Farm Bureau. The AgriGate farmer contracts
were for a minimum of 5 years, and 20% of the carbon offsets generated were held back in a reserve
pool to cover any carbon storage shortages (if some
farmers did not complete their contracts, for example). Any offsets remaining in the reserve pool at the
end of the contract period were sold. The farmer application process relied heavily on FSA information,
which simplified the process. AgriGate sold carbon
credits, deducted its costs and a 10% selling commission, and distributed the remainder to participating
farmers (Leonard pp. 337-40). I would estimate that
farmers probably received around half of the carbon
credit sale proceeds. During this time the Nebraska
Farmers Union was also very active in generating
farmer carbon contracts.
I will note here that the only reason we are discussing
ag carbon credits today and back in the 2003-2010
period is that there were then (and are today) widespread expectations that the U.S. would then (and
will soon) regulate carbon emissions from the power
sector and industry. If there are no U.S. carbon regulations that would encourage U.S. electricity producers and industries to purchase carbon credits, there is
only a very small U.S. market for ag carbon credits. If
President Biden’s clean energy programs fail to
achieve Congressional approval, any momentum towards developing a market in U.S. agricultural carbon credits will likely die.
Are there issues with generating carbon credits on
leased land? Yes, and they are significant.
One drawback of agricultural carbon credits in
cropland is that after the carbon contract expires the
land can be plowed up and the stored carbon released

back into the atmosphere. This possibility makes
cropland carbon credits somewhat problematic,
as the carbon sequestration is not necessarily permanent. This has led to long-term ag carbon contracts, 10-20 years or more. This is not as large a
problem for forests that are managed on a longer
time frame than cropland. Grasslands may fall
somewhere in between cropland and forests.
The longer contract term to ensure longer soil
carbon storage is somewhat at odds with typical
farm leasing patterns in Nebraska and probably
much of the Corn Belt. Most Nebraska farm leases are handshake agreements for one year with no
written lease. I suspect that most written leases
are for one year also with specified renewal procedures. This pattern has led at least one commentator to suggest banning leased land from carbon
markets (Duffy, p. 315). Certainly, if ag carbon
markets become a significant source of farm income, more farm leases will be written for a longer term to qualify for carbon market participation. That would be a dramatic change but it will
happen if the carbon market financial incentives
justify making the change.
Over time, if the nations of the world remain
committed to achieving their net-zero emissions
by 2050 pledges, it likely will become necessary to
adapt carbon contracts to facilitate carbon storage
on leased farmland. But we are a long way from
that point now, and it may be years before we
reach that point.
Should the USDA develop a carbon bank? Yes.
The proposed USDA carbon bank would treat soil
carbon storage like another conservation objective, similar to reducing soil erosion and preventing water pollution from agricultural production.
The carbon bank could be operated similarly to
the conservation reserve program, where farmers
bid their land into the CRP and USDA takes the
lowest qualifying bids. USDA conservation programs already deal with leased land issues, and
the carbon bank could pay farmers to continue
existing soil carbon storage rather than only paying for new practices. According to media accounts, USDA Secretary Vilsack and President
Biden favor developing a USDA carbon bank. Mr.
Vilsack has indicated that USDA might pursue a
pilot project which, if successful, could be the basis for proposing a much larger program to be

approved by Congress. Major advantages of a USDA
soil bank include much less farmer paperwork than
carbon markets would likely require and an expanded
opportunity for landlords and tenants to jointly participate than carbon markets would likely provide, at
least in the short and medium term.
What about international carbon markets? There
are no organized international carbon markets at present. Several nations have established national carbon
markets, including China, and there may be an EU
carbon market. For carbon markets to become more
robust, more countries must commit to net-zero
GHG emissions by 2050 or some similar goal and
back that commitment with action, including programs to regulate and substantially reduce GHG
emissions within their borders. If that happens, carbon markets will sprout like dandelions, and market
operators will see the value of coordination and cooperation. But the commitments and meaningful followup actions have not yet occurred, so we will need to
see what happens in the coming months and years.
What should producers watch for? I would watch
for government actions around the world but especially in the U.S., China and India to reduce carbon
emissions. Without these carbon reduction requirements, there is no increased need or market for ag
carbon credits. So don’t think that carbon reduction
commitments make this all a done deal – they don’t.
They would be a good first step but without follow-up
regulatory programs, the commitments won’t mean
much. The U.S. will be the best barometer of future
progress on carbon reductions: if the Biden administration can get its soon-to-be-announced (we hope)
Clean Energy Standard program approved by Congress, we will be on our way and most other countries
will likely follow our lead. If the Biden climate proposals don’t make it through Congress, then it will be
a much more difficult row to hoe.
Will carbon markets make farmers rich? No, unless
you become a successful carbon credit speculator (and
if you do, you are wasting your time as a farmer). Perhaps carbon credits will evolve into a meaningful
component of farm or ranch income but it won’t happen overnight and a lot of things that have never happened will need to happen soon (like the U.S. agreeing
to limits its carbon emissions).
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